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Using data of Chinese acquirers in strategic sectors, we assess the role of home govern-
ment and the effects of the interaction between ownership type and government-directed
investment policies on acquiring firm value in cross-border acquisitions (CBAs). We find
that CBA activities in strategic sectors encouraged by the home-country government
through its investment policies experience significant increase in acquiring firm value. We
also find that firms investing in government-designated strategic sectors generate wealth
for acquirers, but contrary to efficiency logic rooted in agency theory, state-owned en-
terprises appear to outperform private-owned enterprises. Further analysis indicates that
three financial incentives associated with government-directed policies – namely, interest-
rate reduction, tax incentives and direct subsidies – constitute sources of firm value. Our
results raise several policy implications, including the need for transparent and rule-based
policies and governance systems to be developed and implemented by governments in the
home and host countries to regulate state-supported firms investing in sensitive strategic
sectors.
Introduction
Emerging-market firms have expanded their in-
vestment activities worldwide in recent years, and
in doing so have acquired some iconic firms in
developed countries, signalling their intentions to
compete with established players in global markets
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2018; The Economist, 2012; Xie
et al., 2019). Growing research evidence suggests
that emerging-market governments in India,
China and Brazil support their firms’ internation-
[Correction added on 2 July 2021, after first online pub-
lication: Frank O. Kwabi’s bio has been updated in this
version.]
alization carried out predominantly through cross-
border acquisitions (CBAs) (Du and Boateng,
2015; Heugens, Sauerwald and Turturea, 2020;
Luo, Xue and Han, 2010; OECD, 2016). One
example is the ‘go abroad’ policy1 of the Chinese
government, which fosters Chinese firms’ inter-
national expansion into industries designated as
strategic and priority2 to seek resources unavail-
able in China. Under this policy, both state- and
1Chinese government policy which encourages Chinese
firms to invest in specific sectors abroad through fiscal and
other incentives for firms that comply.
2We define strategic and priority sectors according to
Chinese outward foreign direct investment guidelines (see
Industrial Policy Guide OFDI No. 2006/1312).
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private-owned enterprises (SOEs and POEs) com-
plying with the government policy guidelines in
the ‘go abroad’ strategy receive privileged access to
financial support and other preferential treatment.
The state-led system as documented above chal-
lenges the traditional explanation in international
business literature that foreign direct investment
(FDI) occurs when multinational firms have pro-
prietary resources and skills which lead to a
monopolistic advantage in the host country (i.e.
the asset exploitation perspective) (Caves, 1971;
Makino, Lau and Yeh, 2002). Yet, how home gov-
ernments, the most salient institutions in emerging
countries with resources and capability, influence
firm internationalization and value has not been
examined systematically, resulting in insufficient
understanding of the consequences of their ac-
tions on firms (Hong, Wang and Kafourous, 2015;
Huang et al., 2017).
We investigate the above under-explored issue
from the perspectives of the institution-based view
and agency theory, which jointly postulate that
firms and governments rationally pursue their in-
terests and consider strategic choices which affect
firm value as the outcome of such interactions
(Peng, Wang and Jiang, 2008; Peng et al., 2017).
Home-government support for emerging-market
firms can lead to different strategies, ranging from
more compliance-based strategies, as emphasized
by the institution-based view, to more self-serving
strategies, displaying active agency (Hu, Cui and
Aulakh, 2019). Governments in emerging coun-
tries can directly influence firms’ strategy and
value via country-level and firm-level policies
(Hong, Wang and Kafouros, 2015; North, 1990;
Scott, 2014). However, government ownership or
government association with a firm has costs as
well as benefits, which may increase or decrease
firm value (Benito, Rygh and Lunnan, 2016;
Calomiris, Fisman and Wang, 2010; Dewenter
and Malatesta, 2001; Hansmann, 1996). On the
one hand, government ownership and association
with a firm may engender multilevel agency and
asymmetric information problems (Boubakri,
Cosset and Saffer, 2013; Okhmatovskiy, 2010),
undermine management autonomy, market ori-
entation and strategic flexibility (Estrin, Meyer
and Nielsen, 2016; Huang et al., 2017; Lioukas,
Bourantas and Papadakis, 1993), and may hinder
a firm’s value creation (Lazzarini and Musacchio,
2018; Shleifer, 1998). Conversely, some scholars
document that state ownership or government
connections may provide sources of competitive
advantage in terms of resource acquisition, un-
certainty reduction and offsetting challenges to le-
gitimacy (Benito, Rygh and Lunnan, 2016), which
may enhance firm value (Du and Boateng, 2015;
Zhou et al., 2015).
Grounded in the above, we employ two theo-
retical perspectives which pertain to two different
facets of government–business interaction, that
is ownership and specific government investment
policies, to extend our understanding of the effect
of government–business interaction on firm value.
This is significant and timely, and is in contrast
with prior studies that have tackled this subject
from a single theoretical lens, with mixed results
(see Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001; Shleifer and
Vishny, 1994). In addition, recent literature sug-
gests thatmany host-country governments increas-
ingly restrict or place barriers on international
economic transactions of firms investing in strate-
gic sectors3 due to security and economic concerns
(Levine, Lin and Shen, 2020; OECD, 2016; Sultan
Balbuena, 2016). Indeed, evidence suggests that
the concerns of host-country governments am-
plify when the acquisition investments are made
by SOEs and POEs supported by their home-
country governments (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2018;
Kirkegaard, 2020), with effects on transaction
costs and firm value4 (see Klein et al., 2013). Yet
prior literature has paid virtually no attention to
the interaction effect of ownership type and home-
country government-directed investment policies
on acquiring firm value (see Levine, Lin and Shen,
2020). This study addresses this research gap.
The study examines the effects of ownership
type and the role of home-country government
to explore the effects of interaction between
ownership type and government-directed invest-
ment policies on the value of the acquiring firm.
We do so by employing data from a sample of
3Seven European Union countries, including France, the
UK, Germany and Italy, accounting for 66.5% of to-
tal inward Chinese FDI over the 2000–2018 period, had
investment-screening mechanisms for acquisitions in the
high-technology sector. Similarly, the Committee on For-
eign Investment in the United States reviewed a total
of 76 acquisitions over the 2013–2015 period (Annual
Congress Report). In some cases, host governments block
acquisitions.
4For example, the perceived association of Chinese tech-
nology giant Huawei (POE) with the Chinese government
and army slowed down its revenue growth, with net profit
margin decreasing to 7.3%, down from 8%, in the first
quarter of 2020, due to the US government’s restrictions
imposed in late 2019 (The Telegraph, 2020).
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695 Chinese firms which engaged in CBAs in
Asia, Europe and North America over the period
1998–2015. We find that both SOE and POE
acquirers investing in strategic sectors encouraged
by the home-country government through its in-
vestment policies experience significant increases
in firm value. Contrary to efficiency logic rooted
in agency theory, which posits that POEs are
more efficient compared to SOEs, we find that
SOEs outperform POEs. Our results are robust to
alternative measures and endogeneity concerns.
The study makes contributions to the institu-
tional explanation of emerging-country firms’ in-
ternationalization and performance. First, a large
body of literature mostly based on agency theory
provides overwhelming evidence that state owner-
ship and firms associated with government are in-
compatible with efficiency due tomultilevel agency
and asymmetric information problems (Shleifer,
1998). Consequently, prior studies tend to over-
look the importance of institutions and how
SOEs and government-affiliated firms can exploit
certain institutional advantages and resources to
overcome institutional voids and increase firm
value (Inoue, Lazzarini and Musacchio, 2013;
Musacchio, Lazzarini and Aguilera, 2015). We
show that SOEs and firms associated with gov-
ernment enable Chinese firms to access resources
at lower cost, overcome institutional impediments
and as a result earn abnormal returns. Thus, our
findings indicate that home-country government-
directed investment policies provide an important
vehicle to offset ownership disadvantages and
location disadvantages of emerging-country firms
investing in other countries and help create value
for acquirers.
Second, the study’s findings provide a new
framework for how state ownership, firms asso-
ciated with government and home-government
investment policies interact to influence value cre-
ation of emerging-market firms. Our framework
suggests that home governments in emerging mar-
kets help shape the internationalization and value
creation of emerging-market acquirers. Thus, the
international growth of emerging-market firms
and their subsequent performance are not only
a function of host-country incentive policies and
firm-specific factors, as documented in prior litera-
ture (Caves, 1971; Gubbi et al., 2010; Makino, Lau
and Yeh, 2002; Morck and Yeung, 1992). Home-
country institutions, conceptualized as govern-
ment rules and policies, matter. This may even be
the case where the home-country government’s
support for firms investing in sensitive technology
sectors may endow such firms with suspicion and
in some cases lead to imposition of restrictions by
the host government (OECD, 2016). Our findings
show that, notwithstanding the costs and restric-
tions associated with government support, Chi-
nese international acquisitions improve firm value.
Theory and hypothesis development
Institution-based view and agency perspective
While there is broad agreement among researchers
that institutions are vital for firms, the issue of how
institutions matter is less understood (Aguilera
and Grøgaard, 2019; Crotty, Driffield and Jones,
2016; Peng, Wang and Jiang, 2008). Scott (2001)
defines institutions as encompassing three pillars:
regulatory, cognitive and normative. Our point
of interest in this study is on the regulatory pillar
of institutions (i.e. formal institutions), where
home-government-directed investment policies
provide an incentive structure that affects the
costs and benefits of doing business and acquiring
firm value (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Donnelly
and Manolova, 2020; Peng, 2003; Peng et al.,
2017). Hu, Cui and Aulakh (2019) and Peng
et al. (2017) highlight the pervasive influence of
emerging-market governments over businesses
by using policy inducements to encourage firms’
international expansion and reward them for
their adherence. In the context of China, since
1999 the government has encouraged local firms
through fiscal and other incentives to expand
internationally into specific sectors. It is argued
that such incentive policies are critical not only for
emerging-market firms’ internationalization, but
also for their competitive advantage. According
to Du and Boateng (2015), home-country govern-
ment policies reduce institutional constraints and
transaction costs, which may enhance the success
of acquisition in terms of financial performance.
Conversely, firms connected with the government
are more likely to face investment restrictions
in host countries when acquiring foreign firms
in sensitive technology sectors (Levine, Lin and
Shen, 2020; OECD, 2016; Sultan Balbuena, 2016).
This not only makes acquisitions in strategic sec-
tors risky, but may entail significant transaction
costs with potential implications for destroying
acquiring firm value. Thus, home-government
policies which play an important role in shaping
emerging-market firms’ international expansion
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entail costs as well as benefits, with palpable
implications for firm value. Such considerations
have not been examined systematically.
While prior literature has examined the effects
of ownership on firm performance, relatively
little academic research has been devoted to
the effects of ownership structure and value of
firms investing in designated strategic sectors
(Du and Boateng, 2015; Fuentelsaz, Garrido and
González, 2020; Okhamatovskiy, 2010; Scalera,
Mukherjee and Piscitello, 2020; Zhou, Gao and
Zhao, 2017). Nakamara and Xie (1998) argue
that the ownership structure of acquiring firms is
particularly important for technology-based firms
whose competitive advantage comes in the form of
intangible assets and which are more susceptible
to agency problems. For example, Grossman and
Hart (1986) and Nakamura and Xie (1998) note
that in general it is difficult to write a legal contract
which prohibits potential foreign competitors from
unauthorized use of proprietary technology under
joint equity ownership, thereby leading to agency
conflict. Another potential source of agency
conflict is that governments as owners in emerg-
ing markets may be concerned with technological
progress and how to improve their country’s global
competitiveness, rather than profit maximization
as an objective of the firm (Megginson and Netter,
2001; Shleifer, 1998). Thus, state ownership is
frequently seen as a source of agency problems
and more likely to destroy firm value. Compared
to private ownership, government ownership is
perceived to be costly and lowers market valua-
tion (Chen, Firth and Xu, 2009) due to conflict
of objectives and goals (Megginson and Netter,
2001; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). In short, CBAs
in strategic sectors are more prone to agency prob-
lems5 and may affect firm value (Huang et al.,
2017; Okhmatovskiy, 2010; Shleifer, 1998).
Based on the above discussion, we expect home-
government investment policies, ownership type
and the interaction between government invest-
ment policies and ownership type to influence
acquiring firm market valuation. We next develop
three hypotheses in respect of ownership type, the
role of home- government support and firm value.
5SOEs are owned by the citizens of a country, with politi-
cians acting as principals pursuing political and social
goals attractive to them rather than the goals of the cit-
izens and the firm (Shleifer, 1998; Shleifer and Vishny,
1994).
Ownership type and firm value
The prevailing view in the management and fi-
nance literature emphasizes agency problems
as the main reason for underperformance of
SOEs and firms affiliated with government (see
Calomiris, Fisman and Wang, 2010; Tian and
Estrin, 2008; Zhou et al., 2015; Zhou, Gao and
Zhao, 2017). Thus, the argument that state own-
ership may also engender benefits for firms is
scarcely examined. However, scholars such as
Musacchio and Lazzarini (2014) and Zhou, Gao
and Zhao (2017) argue that state ownership and
firms’ association with the state enables access to
more capital and subsidies, enhances the ability
to borrow more at a lower cost and increases ac-
cess to privileged information, which may increase
firm value. For example, Benito, Rygh and Lunnan
(2016) and Okhmatovskiy (2010) highlight that
government financial and non-financial support
for these firms not only strengthens their market
position but constitutes a means for competitive
advantage and increase in firm value.
Musacchio and Lazzarini (2014), Ralson et al.
(2006) and Stan, Peng and Bruton (2014) point
out that SOEs in emerging markets, particularly
China, have evolved to become market-oriented
and dynamic competitors and tend to enjoy greater
autonomy in operational and other decisions
than they did a few decades ago. Others, such as
Heugens, Sauerwald and Turturea (2020), theorize
that, comparedwith private acquirers, state acquir-
ers are more likely to exhibit strong commitment
to reduce agency conflict and ensure efficiency
of their investment overseas. This is because the
success of their acquisition activities implies the
success of home-government investment policy
that supports these firms. Thus, we hypothesize:
H1: Chinese SOE acquirers will generate a higher
firm value compared with Chinese POE
acquirers.
Government-directed investment policy and firm
value
In line with the ‘go abroad’ policy, which classifies
some sectors as a priority,6 the Chinese govern-
ment encourages firms involved in international
6In 1999, the Chinese government adopted a policy of
helping Chinese firms to access to advanced technol-
ogy and other strategic resources overseas unavailable in
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acquisitions through low interest loans and sub-
sidies (Xiao and Sun, 2005). For example, the
National Development and Reform Commission
(NDRC) and EXIM Bank of China jointly issued
a policy statement regarding the eligibility of fiscal
incentives and credit facilities for international
projects endorsed by the government (Zhou et al.,
2015). Under this policy, the Chinese government
– through the above agencies – will provide cheaper
credit facilities to FDI projects in the following
strategic sectors: exploration of a natural resource
such as energy, oil, gas and precious metal mining;
promotion of textile exports; and research and
development investment in advanced technology.
We expect all firms, irrespective of ownership type,
complying with the criteria contained in the Indus-
trial Policy Guide OFDI No. 2006/1312 and in-
vesting in government-designated priority sectors
to obtain government support that may increase
acquirers’ firm value. Therefore, we hypothesize:
H2: Chinese acquiring firms investing in Chi-
nese government-designated priority sectors
in line with government-directed investment
policies will generate a higher firm value.
Investment policy and firm value: The moderating
role of ownership type
It may be argued that, compared to POEs, SOEs
would be more likely to fully conform to state-
directed policies, for the following reasons. Ac-
cording to the Chinese Company Act 1993, board
directors of SOEs are allocated by the State
Asset Supervision and Administration Commis-
sion (SASAC), with most of them being top
state officials working in various ministries and
state agencies (Francis, Hasan and Sun, 2009;
Zhou et al., 2015). Fan, Wong and Zhang (2007)
document that SOEs’ strategies, including CBA
decisions, are eventually approved by the gov-
ernment, hence the state has a major influence
on acquisition operations and can affect firm
value. Thus, SOEs are likely to take speedy ac-
China (see Industrial Policy Guide OFDI No. 2006/1312;
Deng, 2003; Cai, 1999; Wu and Sia, 2002). The Chi-
nese government provides information on the barriers and
challenges faced by Chinese firms, and cheaper and quick
access to credit for firms acquiring firms in the following
areas: energy, natural resources, mining, gas and oil, pro-
motion of textile exports. The priority sectors in this study
are minerals, petroleum, textiles and high technology.
quisition decisions, which are important for the
success of merger and acquisition (M&A) deals.
Wang et al. (2020) and Zhou et al. (2015) argue
that, because senior managers work closely with
the government, this may enhance information
sharing, quick decision making and firms’ ability
to access new opportunities, and hence higher
returns. Accordingly, we hypothesize:
H3: Positive returns will accrue to both Chinese
SOE and Chinese POE acquirers investing in
the Chinese government-designated priority
sectors; however, the returns will be higher for
SOEs compared to POEs.
Research methods and data
Data and sample selection
We report the data source and the process through
which the sample was selected in Table 1. The
sample comprises Chinese listed firms involved
in international acquisitions over the 1998–2015
period. The dates of acquisition announcement,
completion and the parties involved were derived
from the records of the Chinese StockMarket and
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database.We em-
ployed the following preliminary criteria to select
firms to be part of the study sample: (i) the shares
of the acquiring firms are traded on the two stock
exchanges (i.e. Shenzhen and Shanghai) which
deal in shares quoted in Chinese currency and are
restricted to mainland China-based firms; (ii) the
target and the acquirer firms must not be a trust or
financial firm because of the nature of their assets
and how they are regulated; (iii) the share price
information of the acquiring firm should be avail-
able on CSMAR. The above restrictions resulted
in an initial sample of 840 acquiring firms. To set
apart the effects of each acquisition accurately, we
determined that there should be no other business
announcements within 10 days prior to or after the
acquisition announcement in order not to distort
stock market reaction. Additionally, the bidder
should not engage in other acquisition activity
within 3months of the acquisition announcement.
Further, we required continuous data around the
announcement date for a period of at least 280
days. Imposition of the above requirements
yielded a sample of 695 acquiring firms.
Panels B–E of Table 1 show the foreign lo-
cations of the targets, priority/non-priority
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
Academy of Management.
6 A. Boateng et al.
Table 1. Sample selection and patterns of distribution
Frequency Percentage
Panel A: Sample selection
CBA after initial restrictions 840 100
Less: CBA without full data 86 25.71
Less: multiple acquisitions 57 18.57
Total 695 55.72
Panel B: Regional distribution
Asia/Pacific 367 52.81
North America 138 19.86
European Union 190 27.33
Total 695 100.0
Panel C: Sector classification by state policy

























Panel E: CBA by ownership type
Private-owned enterprise 232 33.38
State-owned enterprise 463 66.62
Total 695 100.0
Total 695 100
classification according to the Chinese gov-
ernment’s ‘go abroad’ policy, yearly distribution
of acquisition deals and ownership type. As can
be seen from the table, about 52.81% of the acqui-
sitions occurred in the Asian region, with about
47.19% occurring in North America and Euro-
pean countries. The classification of firms into
priority and non-priority was based on the Chi-
nese government’s ‘go abroad’ policy guide. The
table shows that about 43.17% of the firms in the
sample were in priority sectors, while non-priority
sectors constitute about 56.83%. Regarding the
yearly distribution, the table indicates that the
trends of acquisitions fluctuated over the sample
period. The highest number of acquisitions took
place in 2010 and 2012, followed by 2009 and
2015, with the lowest number occurring in 1998.
In terms of ownership, most of the acquiring
firms (about two-thirds) come from SOEs, with
POEs constituting about one-third. This confirms
that, despite enterprise reforms and privatization,
state ownership remains a key feature of China’s
corporate landscape.
Measurement of dependent and
independent variables
Firm value
Prior studies indicate that the choice of per-
formance measure is a difficult issue and has
been a critical concern to researchers for many
years (see Goldbeng, Grunfeld and Benito, 2008;
Gubbi et al., 2010). As a result, scholars have
employed a variety of financial indicators, in-
cluding accounting-based profitability measures
and short-term/long-term stock market returns to
assess firm performance. In this study, we chose
stock market reactions to acquisition announce-
ments as manifested in the changes of stock prices
around the acquisition event window to measure
firm value for several reasons. First, the central ob-
jective of this investigation is to assess the effects
of specific home-government-directed investment
policy on CBA performance. To effectively capture
the value effect of this specific government inter-
vention which occurred at the start of overseas
expansion, it is important to focus on and clearly
measure that specific event and attribute the im-
pact of the policy intervention to it. Scholars
such as Cording, Christmann and King (2008),
Haleblian, Kim and Rajagopalan (2006) and
Kale, Dyer and Singh (2002) and contend that
stock market reaction to M&A pronouncements
is expected to capture the price effect of the focal
acquisition. Indeed, stock price movement is ar-
gued to have stronger predictive value compared
to objective measures like ROA and ROE and
tends to correlate with the actual value of a firm
(Haleblian, Kim and Rajagopalan, 2006; Kale,
Dyer and Singh, 2002). Second, stock market
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reaction to M&A pronouncement contains both
financial and non-financial information, such as
expected future cash flows, costs associated with
integration and cultural risk (Schoenberg, 2006).
Lastly, for a considerable period of time, studies
in management and finance have widely employed
a stock market performance measure (see Gubbi
et al., 2010; Haleblian, Kim and Rajagopalan,
2006; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005; Morck
and Yeung, 1992). Grounded in the above, we use
CARs accruing to shareholders as a measure of
firm value.
We estimate CARs by employing a standard
event study method – the market model (Brown
and Werner, 1985). The CAR measure for our
main analysis is calculated over a window period
of 2 days (t−1, t+1).7 We derived the firm’s abnor-
mal returns by subtracting expected returns based
on a market model from the firm’s actual stock
returns.8 We calculate and analyse the CARs over
the following period (t−260, t−21), that is 260
trading days preceding the date of announcement
of acquisition up to 21 continuous trading days
before the acquisition announcement, where t = 0
represents the day of acquisition announcement.
Independent and control variables
The main predictor variables are sectors sup-
ported by the Chinese government and classified
as priority, ownership type and the interaction
between priority sector and ownership type (POE
and SOE). We measure our predictor variables as
follows. First, SOE is measured as equity capital
invested by the central and local governments, and
state agencies and institutions (see Lin and Bo,
2012). POE is the percentage of equity capital held
by the firm’s individuals and non-state institutions.
Second, we collect industry data from official
sources under the State Council,9 which classifies
industries into ‘priority/encouraged’ and ‘non-
7The results hold for the following window periods: (−1,
+1); (−2, +2); (−10, +10).
8Shanghai composite return is a proxy for market returns.
9The official policy document – Industrial Policy toGuide
Outward Foreign Direct Investment, issued by the fol-
lowing ministries and state agencies/departments: Com-
merce, Foreign Affairs, Finance, State Development and
Reforms Commission, General Administration of Cus-
toms, State Taxation Administration and State Admin-
istration of Foreign Exchanges listing priority industries
and non-priority industries.
priority’ industries. Next, we group the industries
into types that distinguish between the priority
and non-priority industries. Firms that adhere to
Chinese government-directed policy to invest in
designated sectors are deemed as priority sector
firms, whereas firms investing in non-designated
sectors are regarded as non-priority sectors. We
then apply a dummy coded as 1 if the acquisition is
in a priority industry, 0 if otherwise.We also collect
data in respect of sample firms relating to the main
fiscal and financial incentive devices employed in
the government-directed investment policies for
sample firms investing in priority sectors as an al-
ternative measure for robustness check. We identi-
fied each firm in the sample by the actual fiscal and
financial supports given to it by the government for
investing in the designated priority. We matched
these firms against the priority and non-priority
sectors as contained in the government Industrial
Policy Guide OFDI No. 2006/1312 to confirm
that these firms are indeed classified as strategic
and grouped as firms conforming to government-
directed investment policy. To test whether own-
ership type interacts with government investment
policies to influence firm value, we further create
interaction variables between ownership types (i.e.
SOE and POE) and firms investing in the priority
industry (i.e. SOE*Priority and POE*Priority).
Firm-specific variables
Following the M&A literature, firm-specific fac-
tors, cultural distance and geographical variables
are controlled in our regression analysis. We oper-
ationalize the acquirer’s previous experience as the
number of international acquisitions made prior
to the CBA announcement. Following Boateng
and Bi (2014), acquirer cash flows (Cash hold) is
measured as cash and cash equivalent scaled by
the total assets. Acquirer size is the natural loga-
rithm of the acquiring firm’s total assets (Moeller,
Schlingemann and Stulz, 2004). Relative value
ratio is the target’s transaction value scaled by the
total market capitalization of the acquirer. Deal
size is the natural logarithm of the amount as con-
sideration by the acquirer (Li, Li andWang, 2016).
Firm relatedness is a dummy variable which equals
1 if the bidder and target are in a similar business,
and 0 otherwise (Singh and Montgomery, 1987).
Cash payment is a dummy which equals 1 if cash
is used to pay for the purchase consideration,
and 0 otherwise (Boateng and Bi, 2014). Acquirer
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return on assets (AROA) is a proxy of acquirer’s
net profit after tax scaled by the book value of
the total assets (Danbolt and Maciver, 2012). We
control for intangible resources using acquirer
Tobin’s Q, which is measured as the market value
of equity and book value of debt divided by the
book value of equity plus book value of debt
prior to the acquisition announcement (Cuypers,
Cuypers and Martin, 2017).
Cultural distance
Utilizing the four dimensions of Hofstede (1980)
(i.e. uncertainty avoidance, power distance, in-
dividualism and masculinity10), cultural distance
is calculated as the difference in scores between
China and the country in which the target firm is
located. Boubakri et al. (2016) and Steigner and
Sutton (2011) document that these four dimen-
sions are considered fundamental drivers of cul-
tural differences across countries and have been
shown to have effects on corporate growth, eco-
nomic behaviour and performance. We calculated
the cultural distance by employing the Kogut and









whereCDj is the cultural difference of the jth coun-
try from the cth country, Iij is Hofstede’s score for
the ith cultural dimension and jth country, Iic is
Hofstede’s score for the ith cultural dimension and
cth country and Vi is the variance of the score of
the dimension.
Geographical influences on acquiring firm value
Prior studies suggest that the geographical region
of the target firm can affect the value of acquir-
ing firms (Kiymaz, 2004; McCarthy and Aalbers,
2016). We therefore include the following dummy
variables for each of the three regions representing
the location of the target firm as follows: North
America 1, and 0 otherwise; Europe 1, and 0 oth-
erwise; Asia 1, and 0 otherwise. Furthermore, we
also included year and acquirer industry dummies.
10We also use nine GLOBAL dimensions of national cul-
ture for robustness check.
Table 2. Abnormal returns of acquiring firms (firm value)
Event window CAR (%) Z-statistics p-Value
CAR (−10, +10) 0.5776 6.7860 0.000
CAR (−5, +5) 0.6122 6.6952 0.000
CAR (−2, +2) 0.5763 5.5358 0.000
CAR (−1, +1) 0.5204 6.2504 0.000
CAR (−1, 0) 0.3767 6.8524 0.000
Note: This table presents the abnormal returns around CBM&A
announcement days. CAR denotes cumulative abnormal returns.
The summary of variable measurements is pre-
sented in the Appendix.
Results and discussion
Firm value following announcement
In Table 2, we report the results of announcement
returns (i.e. acquiring firm value) for the following
event windows: 0, +1; −1, +1; −2, +2; −5, +5;
−10, +10. The results indicate that the acquiring
firms earn abnormal returns in all five event win-
dows, suggesting that CBA announcements create
wealth for acquiring firms. The returns accruing to
the acquiring firms range from 0.38% to 0.61% for
the five different event windows.
Univariate analysis
Table 3 presents summary statistics and the cor-
relation between the variables in our model. The
mean score for SOE is about 69%, while that for
POE is 31%. Cultural distance has a mean score
of 2.287, indicating that the majority of the CBAs
occurred in countries which differ significantly
from China in terms of culture. In terms of the
correlation matrix, the majority of the correla-
tions display low coefficients but, as a further
check of multicollinearity, we implemented the
variance inflation factor procedure. All the values
are within an acceptable threshold.
To ascertain whether there are differences in
terms of value creation between acquirers invest-
ing in government-designated priority and non-
priority sectors, and then state-owned and private
enterprises, we carried out a test of differences via
independent t test for the following event windows:
−1, +1; −2, +2. We find that acquirers under-
taking acquisitions in government-designated
sectors classified as priority have relatively higher
mean scores compared to acquirers investing in
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
Academy of Management.
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Table 4. Univariate t test
Event window Variable Mean SD t-Value
CAR (−1, +1) Priority sector 0.4559 0.5417
Non-priority sector 0.0804 0.3791 2.447**
CAR (−2, +2) Priority sector 0.5591 0.0823
Non-priority sector 0.2365 0.6543 2.602**
CAR (−1, +1) SOE 0.8040 0.7636
POE 0.2661 0.3160 2.014**
CAR (−2, +2) SOE 1.2777 0.5227
POE 0.2959 0.0455 1.993**
Note: This table presents the test of differences between the priority and non-priority sectors, and SOEs and POEs over two event
windows (−1, +1; −2, +2).
***p < 0.01.
**p < 0.05.
*p < 0.1; number of cases = 695.
non-priority sectors in the two event windows. Re-
garding the relationship between ownership type
and firm value, Table 4 documents a significant
difference between SOEs and POEs, with the SOEs
outperforming the POEs in the two event windows.
Regression results
This article examines the impact of state-directed
investment policy and ownership type and explores
the effects of interactions between ownership type
and home-country government investment policies
on firm value. To test our hypotheses, our basic re-
gression model is given as follows:
Firm value = β0 + β1Priority + β2SOE + β3POE




β6Controls + εit (2)
where our dependent variable firm value is the
short-term acquirer returns (CAR). Priority sector
represents a proxy for home-government-directed
policies where financial incentives are offered to
firms investing in those sectors. SOE and POE
represent ownership type. SOE*Priority and
POE*Priority represent the interactions of own-
ership type and government-directed incentives
in the priority sectors, while Controls represents
a set of control variables, namely, relatedness,
ROA, Tobin’s Q, cash holding, relative size, prior
experience, deal size, size of the acquirer, regional
dummies and cultural distance.
Ownership type, government-directed policies and
firm value
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 document the effects
of ownership type and firms investing in prior-
ity sectors. The findings concerning the priority
sectors and the combined effects of ownership
type and priority sector investments are shown in
columns 3 and 4 of the table. Our findings show
that SOEs and other acquirers investing in priority
sectors generate abnormal returns for acquirers.
The results confirm the t-test results in Table 4,
which suggest that SOEs and firms investing in
priority sectors have higher mean returns com-
pared to POEs and firms investing in non-priority
sectors, thereby providing some support for H1
and H2. The results that SOEs are positively
associated with the firm value of acquiring firms
appear to be inconsistent with the efficiency-based
economic view, which contends that SOEs are
incompatible with efficiency due to bureaucracy,
differences between firm strategy and resource
allocation decisions, and severe agency problems
(Cuervo-Cazurra and Ramamurti, 2014; Gold-
beng, Grunfeld and Benito, 2008; Huang et al.,
2017; Okhmatovskiy, 2010; Shleifer, 1998). One
probable explanation is that SOEs from emerging
markets have evolved from poorly governed firms
into viable and well-governed competitive firms
due to the greater operational and investment au-
tonomy given to the managers of these firms (Ral-
son et al., 2006; Zhou, Gao and Zhao, 2017). The
SOE reforms which started in 1990 may have re-
duced agency conflicts often associated with SOEs
under the former planned economy. This point
is demonstrated by the volume of Chinese firms
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 5. Effects of ownership, state-directed policies and interactions on firm value





























SOE*Priority – – 0.284***
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Year dummy Included Included Included Included
Industry dummy Included Included Included Included
F-value 6.454*** 6.844*** 6.317*** 6.093***
Adjusted R2 0.142 0.135 0.146 0.141
Note: This table reports the results of the effects of priority sector, ownership types, interactions between priority sector and ownership
type on firm value. The dependent variable is CAR (−1, +1). Variables are defined in the Appendix. Our specification includes year
and acquirer industry dummies.
***p < 0.01.
**p < 0.05.
*p < 0.1; number of cases = 695.
listed on the 2019 Fortune Global 500, with over
two-thirds of the 129 Chinese firms being SOEs
and having a combined revenue of US$8.2 trillion
(Xinhuanet.com, 23 July 2019). The reforms may
also explain why Sinopec, a state-owned Chinese
oil company, tops the global ranking of firms by
revenues and assets. Another plausible explanation
for our findings may be that the lower interest rates
and other fiscal incentives offered to Chinese ac-
quirers undertaking investments in priority sectors
© 2021 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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may lead to higher future cash flows and increased
financial flexibility of acquiring firms, enabling
them to take advantage of future investment op-
portunities and helping to overcome uncertainties
associated with internationalization. As a result,
stock markets may perceive the financial and other
fiscal incentives positively, leading to improved
market returns and firm value. Taken together, the
reforms and the government ‘go abroad policy’
which provide resources to these SOEs may nullify
the effects of agency costs associated with these
firms, leading to an increase in firm value.
Regarding the positive and significant rela-
tionship between home-country government
investment policies and the firm’s market value,
a possible explanation for this finding is that the
resources embodied in home-country government
policies lead to competitive advantage and value
creation for Chinese acquiring firms. Thus, gov-
ernment financial and fiscal incentives serve as a
means to acquire other resources and provide ac-
quiring firms with strategic flexibility that helps ac-
quiring firms to adjust to a complex and dynamic
international environment (Patzelt and Shepherd,
2009), thereby increasing acquirers’ returns.
The moderating role of ownership type
To probe further whether government support
drives the acquirer firm’s value irrespective of
ownership type, we carried out further analysis
for firms investing in priority sectors accord-
ing to ownership type (i.e. SOEs and POEs).
We therefore enter the interaction variables for
ownership types and government-directed policy
(SOE*Priority; POE*Priority) successively, in line
with previous studies. The coefficients of interac-
tions between SOE and priority sectors, and that
of POE and priority sectors, shown in columns
3 and 4 of Table 5, have positive signs which are
significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
The findings suggest that both SOEs and POEs
investing in government-designated priority sec-
tors create value for the Chinese acquiring firms.
However, the changes in firms’ market values are
higher for SOEs compared to POEs. Following
Brambor, Clark and Golder (2005), who provide
a comprehensive literature on multiplicative in-
teraction models, we confirm the difference in
market values of SOEs and POEs by estimating
the net effects of the interactions of SOE*Priority
and POE*Priority.11 The results indicate that the
net effect for SOE*Priority is higher than the
net effect for POE*Priority and provide support
for H3. Overall, the findings suggest that the use
of financial and other incentives helps Chinese
acquiring firms to overcome their competitive dis-
advantages and improves wealth creation of these
firms irrespective of ownership type; however,
SOEs benefit more than POEs.
Consistent with prior studies, we find a num-
ber of control variables in our regressions to be
significant. The study’s results show that cultural
differences tend to reduce the acquiring firm re-
turns and such results are highly significant. This
finding renders support to the conclusions drawn
by the studies of Boateng et al. (2019) and Li, Li
and Wang (2016), who found cultural distance to
increase transaction cost and risk and negatively
affect firm value. For firm-specific variables, we
find that cash-financed acquisitions, relatedness,
Tobin’s Q, prior experience and the deal size im-
pact on firm value. Specifically, we find cash as a
method of payment for acquisitions and firm value
of acquirers to be negatively related, suggesting
that Chinese acquirers might over-pay the target
firms due to overvaluation arising from informa-
tion asymmetry between them and their overseas
targets. As expected, we find acquirer Tobin’s Q
and prior experience positively influence firm value
(Lang, Stulz and Walking, 1991). Regarding prior
experience, we find prior foreign acquisition expe-
rience to improve firm value as expected (see Hitt,
Hoskisson and Ireland, 2001). We find firm relat-
edness to be positively associated with firm value
at the 1% level; however, deal size negatively af-
fects firm value, with the effect being significant at
the 10% level. Regarding geographical influences,
acquisitions in Asia tend to create wealth for ac-
quiring firms but acquisitions in North America
and Europe appear to have an insignificant effect
on firm value.
11As recommended by Brambor, Clark and Golder
(2005), we computed the net effects of SOE * Priority and
POE * Priority. For SOE * Priority, the net effect is esti-
mated: (0.284× 0.41)+ 0.110= 0.22644; 0.110 is the con-
ditional effect of interaction between SOE and priority
sector; 0.284 is the unconditional positive effect of SOE;
and 0.41 is the average score. Using the same method, the
net effect for POE * Priority is 0.14347. The market value
is higher for SOE compared to POE.
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Table 6. Incentives associated with state-directed policies to facil-
itate expansion
Government financial support Number Percentage
Interest rate reduction on loans 16 5.3
Tax support 45 14.9
Interest rate reduction and tax support 61 20.3




Note: This table reports the fiscal/financial incentives provided by
the home-country government to Chinese acquiring firms invest-
ing in priority sectors.
Sources of firm value underpinning state-directed
policies
We explore the potential sources of firm value
associated with state-directed policies. Under
the ‘go abroad’ policy, Chinese firms investing
in priority sectors (see Industrial Policy Guide
OFDI No. 2006/1312) enjoy both financial and
non-financial support such as low lending rates,
tax support, subsidies and information about
doing business in the target country. Table 6
reports the sources of support underpinning the
government-directed policies. The table shows that
the three main sources of fiscal/financial support
offered to Chinese acquiring firms are interest rate
reduction for loans, tax incentives and direct gov-
ernment subsidies. In terms of support offered to
firms conforming to government-directed policies,
14.9% is in the form of tax incentives, representing
the single largest source of incentives offered to
acquiring firms. This is followed by interest rate
reductions on loans, constituting 5.3%. Following
that is a combination of interest rate reduction on
loans and tax incentives, amounting to 20.3%, and
lastly a combination of subsidies, interest rates
reduction on loans and tax incentives, at 59.5%.
Robustness check and endogeneity concerns
In this section, we report the additional robust-
ness checks of our results. First, we employed
fiscal/financial incentives (identified in Table 6)
offered by the Chinese government to acquiring
firms investing in priority sectors as a proxy for
government-directed investment policies (GOV-
SUBS). Second, we replaced CAR (−1, +1) with a
much longer event window (−5, +5) as a measure
of firm value. Next, the number of employees
Table 7. Robustness check







































































Year dummy Included Included
Industry dummy Included Included
F-value 5.379*** 5.175***
Adjusted R2 0.149 0.174
Note: Cumulative abnormal returns for the event window (−2,
+2) is a dependent variable. Variables are defined in the Ap-
pendix. GOVSUBS is an alternative measure for the priority sec-





was used as an alternative measure for acquir-
ing firm size. Lastly, we employed the GLOBE
data to measure the cultural distance (see House
et al., 2004). Following Kogut and Singh’s (1988)
estimation method discussed earlier, we compute
the cultural distance by using all nine GLOBE
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Table 8. Propensity score matching results
Panel A: Predicting the likelihood of acquisition in priority
sectors
Variables Coefficient p-Value
Previous experience 0.364 0.012




Number of cases 695
Panel B: CAR results – treatment versus control groups
Event window Control Treatment Difference p-Value
CAR (−2, +2) 0.008 0.087 −0.078 0.066
CAR (−3, +3) −0.020 0.056 −0.076 0.073
CAR (−5, +5) −0.047 0.050 −0.096 0.024
Note: This table reports the results of the Logit model which es-
timates the likelihood of acquisition in the priority sector, with
dependent variable equal to 1 if an acquisition is present, and 0
otherwise. CAR is cumulative abnormal return based on market
model.
cultural dimensions (see Dikova and Sahib, 2013;
Sarala and Vaara, 2010). Table 7 shows that the
results of the explanatory variables relevant to the
hypotheses are largely similar to the findings in
Tables 4 and 5, with the net effect of the interaction
of SOE*POE*GOVSUBS being positive.12
To overcome the self-selection bias often associ-
ated with the assessment of acquisition effects, we
use propensity score matching (PSM), which gen-
erates a control group very similar to the treated
firms based on observed firm characteristics for
comparison (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). We com-
pare the mean CARs of a portfolio consisting of
deals that involve the priority sector with a con-
trol group involving deals in the non-priority sec-
tor. Table 8 shows that acquisition in the priority
sector increases firm value, thereby confirming our
results reported in Tables 4, 5 and 7.
Conclusion
This paper investigates the impact of ownership
type, state-directed investment policy and the ef-
12We estimate the net effect for SOE*POE*GOVSUBS as
follows: (0.126 × 0.41) + 0.141 = 0.19266, which is pos-
itive, suggesting that the combined effects of SOE, POE
and government subsidies increase firm value.
fects of interactions between ownership type and
home-country government investment policies on
the firm value of Chinese acquirers. Using the
event-study methodology, we find that Chinese
firms making international acquisition invest-
ments generate abnormal returns for acquiring
firms. We document that Chinese acquirers earn
average abnormal returns ranging from 0.38% to
0.62% over the 21-day event window, indicating
that Chinese international acquisitions create
shareholder wealth. The results confirm the earlier
findings of Du and Boateng (2015), who docu-
mented that Chinese international acquisitions
increase firm value. The test of differences and
the cross-sectional regression results evince some
interesting features. Our results indicate that SOEs
and acquiring firms investing in strategic sectors
encouraged by the Chinese government obtain
higher firm value compared to POEs and firms
investing in non-priority sectors. Further analysis
suggests that firms investing in government-
designated strategic sectors earn abnormal returns
irrespective of ownership type (i.e. SOEs and
POEs). However, the returns for SOEs tend to be
higher compared with POEs. Our results indicate
that Chinese SOEs create more value compared
to POEs, and the findings contradict the widely
documented notion that POEs are better per-
formers and more efficient. We therefore conclude
that, notwithstanding the prevailing view that
SOEs suffer severe agency costs and the host gov-
ernments manifest hostility towards acquisitions
by home-government-affiliated firms in sensitive
technology sectors, these investments create value
for Chinese acquirers. The underlying cause of
the value creation may be that firms investing in
designated strategic sectors convey positive signals
to the market about state endorsement, the avail-
ability of financial resources at low cost and other
forms of government support. As a result, these
announcements elicit a positive reaction from
investors and create value for emerging market
firms. A further plausible explanation may be
that SOEs from China have grown from poorly
governed firms into viable and well-governed
competitive firms due to the greater operational
and investment autonomy given to the managers
of these firms (see Bruton et al., 2015; Ralson
et al., 2006). We also show that three main sources
of fiscal and financial support are allied with the
Chinese government-directed investment policy
for firm internationalization, namely, interest
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rate reduction for loans, tax incentives and direct
government subsidies, which drive firm value.
Contribution and implications
We make two important contributions to the liter-
ature. First, from the perspective of agency theory,
a vast amount of literature documents that state
ownership and firms associated with government
are incompatible with efficiency in that the state
tends to use such firms to pursue political and so-
cial objectives that conflict with profit maximiza-
tion (Shleifer, 1998). Consequently, prior studies
overlook the importance of financial resources
associated with SOEs and government-affiliated
firms, which may help to overcome institutional
voids. Drawing on both the institution-based view
and agency theory, we find that state ownership
and firms associated with government enable
Chinese firms to access resources at lower cost,
overcome institutional impediments and, as a
result, earn abnormal returns. Thus, our findings
indicate that home-country government-directed
investment policies provide an important vehicle
to offset ownership disadvantages and location
disadvantages of emerging-country firms investing
in other countries, which significantly improves
firm value.
Second, our findings provide a new frame-
work of how state ownership, firms associated
with government and home-government invest-
ment policies influence the value creation of
emerging-market firms. Our findings indicate that
home-country government-directed investment
policies provide an important vehicle to offset
ownership disadvantages and location disad-
vantages of emerging-country firms investing in
other countries and help create value for Chinese
acquirers. Thus, our framework suggests that
home governments in emerging markets perform
a vital role in shaping the internationalization and
performance of emerging-market acquirers. This
is important given that the majority of M&A re-
search has focused largely on firm-specific factors
and FDI inflows as a function of host-country
incentive policies and how they influence a firm’s
efficiency and value creation (Gubbi et al., 2010;
Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005; Morck and Ye-
ung, 1992). The effects of home-government
investment policies on firm value have re-
ceived limited attention (Tavares-Lehman, 2016).
However, recent research evidence suggests that,
for firms investing in sensitive technology sectors,
the support of the home government may endow
them with suspicion and, in some cases, lead to
imposition of restrictions which may increase
cost and destroy firm value (OECD, 2016). Our
findings show that, notwithstanding the costs and
restrictions associated with government support
for Chinese firms, they create value.
One policy implication is that home-country
governments in emerging markets attempting
to facilitate firm internationalization should use
financial incentives – particularly, interest rate
reduction for loans, tax incentives and direct
government subsidies – as baseline incentives in
addition to others to underpin government in-
vestment policies, as these incentives appear to be
effective vehicles for creating value for acquiring
firms. Another policy implication of our findings
is that home-country government investment
policies appear to help emerging-country firms’
international expansion and enhanced opportu-
nity to acquire resources and capabilities, help
transform emerging markets and consequently in-
crease shareholder wealth. However, it is pertinent
to note that emerging-country firms benefitting
from government-directed investment policies to
facilitate international expansion may be viewed
with suspicion, subjected to additional investment
reviews and even become pawns to the political
diplomacy of host and home governments. This
calls for transparent and rule-based policies and
governance systems to be developed and im-
plemented by national governments in order to
reduce the tensions associated with home-country
government support and host-country govern-
ment suspicion and concerns. For example, host-
country governments can develop monitoring
systems that will provide timely information about
emerging-country firms’ actions in host countries.
This study has illuminated the role of home-
country government investment policies and their
effects on acquiring firm value. However, given
that this study focuses on home-country vari-
ables, the findings should be considered provi-
sional. Consequently, further studies could exam-
ine home-country incentive in conjunction with
specific host-country regulations regarding OFDI
in sensitive technology sectors and employ both
stock market- and accounting-based performance
measures in a cross-country context.
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Appendix
Measurement of independent variables
Variable Measurement
SOE Percentage of equity capital owned
by central government, local
government and government
agencies and institutions as a
majority shareholder (see Lin
and Bo, 2012).
POE Percentage of equity capital to
total equity shareholding held by
private individuals and
non-governmental institutions in





Classification based on Chinese
government document (No.
(2006)1312) grouping sectors
into priority and non-priority
sectors for our sample. A dummy
variable representing priority
sector and non-priority sector
was constructed. Companies
backed by the Chinese
government are coded 1, and 0
otherwise. Non-priority sector
coded 1, and 0 otherwise.
SOE*Priority Interaction between SOE and
home-government investment
policy proxy (Priority).





Cultural distance Hofstede’s (1980) four dimensions




of the Kogut and Singh (1988)
index is used. We also use nine
GLOBE dimensions of national
culture for robustness check.
Regional location of
the target (Region)
We include three regional dummy
variables as follows: 1 if located
in North America, 0 otherwise; 1
if located in Europe, 0 otherwise;
1 if located in Asia, 0 otherwise
(Kiymaz, 2004).
Cash payment Dummy variable which equals 1 if
cash is used to pay for the
purchase consideration, and 0
otherwise (Boateng and Bi,
2014).
Acquirer size Natural logarithm of the total
assets of acquiring firm (Moeller,
Schlingemann and Stulz, 2004).
Deal size Natural logarithm of the amount
paid as a purchase consideration
by the acquirer (Li, Li and
Wang, 2016).
Relative value ratio Calculated as the transaction value
of the target divided by the total
market capitalization of the




Cash and cash equivalents divided
by total assets.
AROA Net profit after taxes divided by the
average total assets at book value
(Danbolt and Maciver, 2012).
Relatedness A dummy variable which equals 1
if the acquirer and target are in a
similar business, and 0 otherwise
(Singh and Montgomery, 1987).
Prior experience Number of prior international
acquisitions made at the time of
purchase.
Acquirer Tobin’s Q Market value of equity plus book
value of debt over the sum of
book value of equity plus book
value of debt prior to the bid
(Cuypers, Cuypers and Martin,
2017).
Year dummies A set of dummy variables that
control for time effect
Industry dummies Acquirer industry dummies
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